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INTRODUCTION 
In re Elsner1 grew out of the rejection of the plant patent applications of 
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary. Mr. Elsner is a plant breeder who resides in Ger­
many and who maintains and "invents" new geraniums.2 In 1997 he filed an 
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Also, I would like to sincerely thank all of those who helped me in thinking about and writing this 
Note. I would specifically like to thank Professor Roberta J. Morris, Professor John F. Duffy, and 
Jenn Kozar for their many ideas and great advice on early drafts. Finally, while I cannot list them 
all, I would like to thank my Note Editors for their hard work, the Michigan Law Review Editorial 
Board for their helpful comments and tremendous patience, and the MLR Associate Editors for their 
citechecking and proofreading. All mistakes are my own. 
I .  381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
2. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1126-27. 
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application for a Plant Breeder's Rights ("PBR") certificate3 at the European 
Community Plant Variety Office that was subsequently published.4 The ap­
plication was for a new type of geranium that originated as a mutation of a 
parent geranium named Pendec.5 The published application disclosed the 
names and addresses of the plant breeder, a statement of botanical classifica­
tion, and a provisional denomination for the plant. In 1998, Mr. Elsner sold 
the geranium in Germany.6 Meanwhile, Mr. Zary filed a PBR certificate in 
South Africa that claimed a new variety of rose plant called the JACopper. 7 
Information about the JACopper included a published certificate that speci­
fied how to contact the JACopper breeder and his South African agent. 8 Mr. 
Zary sold the JACopper in South Africa and Zambia as early as 1996.9 Both 
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary tried to patent their plants in the United States un­
der the Plant Patent Act1° ("PPA") but were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b), the on-sale bar.'' The patent office stated that the published PBR 
applications coupled with the overseas sale of the inventions sufficiently 
placed the public in possession of the invention to make it not novel and 
therefore unpatentable. 1 2 
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary appealed the rejections and the court was faced 
with the question of whether, for the plants of Elsner and Zary, a publication 
that met all of the requirements of 35 U. S.C. § 102 except enablement13 
might be placed in the possession of the public by a related public foreign 
3. A registered PBR certificate denotes that a limited monopoly is given to breeder of a 
uniform, distinct, and stable plant variety. 
4. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1126-27. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 1127. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2004). 
11. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1127. The patent language relating to plants is held in 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 161-164 and described infra Section l.B. The relevant novelty sections state: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a 
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant 
for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country 
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica­
tion for patent in the United States . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2004). 
12. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1127. 
13. A reference must be enabling in order to bar a patent. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek 
Sys., Inc. , 340 F.3d 1314, 1324 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The anticipation analysis asks solely 
whether the prior art reference discloses and enables the claimed invention . . . .  "). As will be dis­
cussed infra Section 11.B, In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 935 (C. C.P.A. 1962), changes the 
enablement requirements of anticipatory references slightly for plants. 
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sale of the invention.1 4 The court held that the sale could be coupled with the 
publication in order to create a statutory bar to a U.S. patent.1 5  
The lack of a consistent theory among Eisner's references, test, and ex­
plicit language makes the scope of Elsner hard to discern. For instance, the 
Federal Circuit first reiterated the bright-line rule that foreign sales coupled 
with a publication cannot be a statutory bar, 16 but then found that for plants, 
a foreign sale coupled with a publication serves as a statutory bar because it 
enables those skilled in the art to access the plant invention.17 
Second, the court stated that it "disagree[d] with Appellants' contention 
that [its] holding will operate to create a printed publication bar whenever a 
non-enabling publication and a foreign sale are involved [because] . . . 'there 
are inherent differences between plants and manufactured articles.' "18 Spe­
cifically, the court distinguished the plants and utility inventions because the 
plants at issue require asexual reproduction to replicate.19 But the Elsner 
court relies on a case involving § 101 patentable inventions-specifically 
microorganisms-which, as this Note will discuss in Section II.C, states the 
similar predicament between asexually reproducing plants and microorgan­
isms. 
Finally, although the court stated that it only distinguished plants be­
cause it "perceive[ d] a difference between plants and statutorily distinct 
inventions,"20 it relied extensively on other. sources that maintain that there 
should be no discrimination between plants and other inventions. For in­
stance, the court quoted approvingly both the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals ("CCPA") in In re LeGrice21 and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office ("USPTO")--each of which came to a broad conclusion 
that plants and utility patents should have the same § 102(b) bars.22 It also 
cited the CCPA, which stated that plants should be treated the same as util­
ity inventions.23 By broadening the references that may be considered as a 
14. See Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1128 ("The particular question thus before us is whether evidence 
of the foreign sale of a claimed reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non-enabled 
printed publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a§ 102(b) bar."). 
15. Id. at 1126. The panel consisted of Judge Lourie, Judge Clevenger, and Judge Bryson, 
with Judge Lourie writing the opinion. The case was decided on August 16, 2004. 
16. Id. at 1128 ("Ordinarily, foreign sales of an invention in combination with a publication 
will not constitute a bar because such a result would circumvent the established rules that neither 
non-enabling publications nor foreign sales can bar one's right to a patent."). 
17. Id. at 1128-29. 
18. Id. at 1129 (quoting In re LeGrice, 301F.2d 929, 935 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). 
19. See id. at 1129 ("In the case of plant patents, the touchstone of the statutory subject mat-
ter is asexual reproduction of a unique biological organism."). 
20. Id. 
21. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
22. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1130, relying on LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 935, stated that "[i]n its deci­
sion reversing the Board, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals discussed at length its view that 
§ 102(b) applies to plant patents in the same way that it applies to utility patents, but acknowledged 
the distinction between plants and other patentable subject matter." 
23. The Elsner court, relying on LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 936, stated that: 
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bar to novelty under § 102, the court effectively made it harder to obtain a 
patent on a plant, thereby discriminating against them. 
One reason Elsner may seem confusing is that it tried to balance con­
flicting congressional directives. On the one hand, the court considered that 
Congress did not want plants to be discriminated against. 24 On the other 
hand, the court had to consider that in the Patent Act, Congress had set cate­
gories of prior art, the combination of which is generally disfavored for 
determinations of patentability.25 Finally, the court considered its gut notions 
of fairness: that a dirty, rotten scoundrel is printing material and selling 
plants abroad but still being allowed to patent them in the United States be­
cause of a technicality. Elsner balanced these concerns by precluding 
novelty for plants if the prior acts put the public in possession of the plant. 
This Note argues that these congressional commands Elsner needed to bal­
ance do not actually require different outcomes and instead indicate that 
courts should extend Eisner's "possession test"26 to all utility inventions. 
Some may critique reconciling the discrimination of plant patents with 
other utility patents by changing all of the patent laws governing utility pat­
ents to the level of the narrow category of plant patents as similar to moving 
a mountain to meet a stone.27 This critique misses the point; the Elsner court 
recognized that in a progressive world where foreign knowledge is more 
available to inventors, the circumstances that determine public possession 
will also need to regularly change. Stated in a different way, the criteria for 
public possession will need to change in order to maintain a continuously 
strict patentability regime. Courts must constantly reconsider the Patent Act 
in light of continuous technology changes if they intend to maintain the con-
The [CCPA] court concluded that Congress had not indicated that § 102(b) should be applied 
differently to plant patents than to other inventions, and the court reiterated that the clause 'de­
scribed in a printed publication' has been interpreted with respect to whether the publication 
has in fact conveyed such knowledge of an invention to the public as to put the public in pos­
session of the invention. 
Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1130. 
24. This concern was set out in the Committee Reports during the enactment of the Plant 
Patent Act when stating that: "The purpose of this bill is to afford agriculture, so far as predicable, 
the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry 
.... The bill will remove the existing discrimination between plant developers and industrial inven­
tors." S. REP. No. 71-315, at 1 (1930); LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932 (stating that this report was 
identical to a report filed by the House Committee on Patents). 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004); Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 713 F.2d 760, 771 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). Recently, a bill has been introduced into Congress that would explicitly change the prior 
art standards for plants to be stricter than those for utility inventions. But, little congressional action 
has been taken on this proposed legislation since it was introduced in January 2005. See infra note 
86. 
26. I will call the test for novelty used in Elsner the "possession test." This test, as applied in 
Elsner and LeGrice, asks a technology-neutral question of "whether one skilled in the art to which 
the invention pertains could take the description of the invention in the printed publication and com­
bine it with his own knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be put in possession 
of the invention on which a patent is sought." Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1128 (quoting LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 
939). 
27. Utility patents are those inventions patented under§ 101 of the Patent Act. Some exam­
ples of things that can be patented under § 101 are the steam engine or a zipper. 
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stant strictness of the patent standard;28 Elsner merely reflects this kind of 
reconsideration. As technology changes, courts should be adapting outdated 
laws to reflect the changing world. 
This Note will show that one can read Elsner broadly to encompass both 
plant-type and widget-type inventions, and that applying Elsner to both 
plants and widgets is within the current statutory framework and case law. 
Such a reading would change the § 102 bar for inventions patentable under 
§ 10i29 (hereinafter referred to as "widgets") as well as for plants. Part I of 
this Note argues that congressional sources require a flexible test-one that 
does not prejudice any objects under the Patent Act. Part II discusses the 
judicial interpretation of the Patent Act prior to Elsner in order to argue first, 
that past cases disfavor discrimination based on invention type and second, 
that courts have already applied a broad reading of Elsner to non-plant in­
ventions. Part III shows that the move toward harmonization of U.S. laws 
with international standards is especially strong in intellectual property. As a 
result, Part III argues that courts should pay attention to international 
sources and harmonize U.S. laws with international standards. Such har­
monization requires considering foreign sales as prior art for all inventions. 
Thus, courts should apply the Elsner court's "possession test" to plants and 
§ 101 inventions, effectively removing the territorial boundary for sales that 
make inventions accessible to the U.S. public. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 
This Part will argue that the language and amendments of the governing 
statutes, the Patent Act and the Plant Patent Act ("PPA"), support a broad 
reading of Elsner that expands its "possession test" to widgets. Section I.A 
will first discuss the historical roots of the Patent Act and conclude that the 
framers of the Patent Act envisioned that the novelty requirement would be 
based on community knowledge similar to Eisner's possession test. Section 
LB will then look to the language of the Plant Patent Act and its amend­
ments to show that the statute's goal was to treat plant inventions the same 
as utility inventions. It then argues that congressional acts targeted changing 
the status of the utility inventions rather than that of plant inventions in or­
der to maintain such nondiscrimination. Finally, Section l.C will explore the 
Plant Variety Protection Act ("PVPA"), a distinct statute that Congress used 
to set up a separate regime for objects that require disparate treatment. Part 
l.C argues that since Congress did not set up a similarly distinct statutory 
regime for asexually reproducing plants, courts should treat these plants the 
same as utility inventions. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 44-56 for an example of how courts have adapted 
laws in response to changing technology. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). For the statutory text, see infra note 33. 
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A. Historical Roots 
Even the earliest tests for novelty have their roots in a test of public ac­
cessibility, meaning that a novelty determination should change with the 
varying level of community knowledge. Historic cases show that varying 
levels of community knowledge correspond with changes in the novelty re­
quirement such that as information becomes more accessible to the 
community, the conditions for patentability change. In 1615, the King's 
Bench explained the need for the novelty requirement in Clothworkers of 
Jpswitch: 
[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the 
kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock or if a 
man hath made a new discovery of any thing, in such cases the King ... in 
recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he 
only shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time, because at first the 
people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to 
use it . . . . 30 
This rationale resulted in the traditional finding that someone could ob­
tain a patent for novel inventions, that is, inventions brought into a state 
where the people did not otherwise have possession. Later, in 1850, Gayler 
v. Wilder based novelty on community possession, stating: 
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already given 
to the world and open to the people of this country, as well as of others, 
upon reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage from 
the invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the community, and the 
inventor therefore is not considered to be entitled to the reward. But, if the 
foreign discovery is not patented, nor described in a printed publication, it 
might be known and used in remote places for ages, and the people of this 
country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining knowledge would 
not be within their reach; and as far as their interest is concerned, it would 
be the same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered. 31 
Both Clothworkers of Jpswitch and Gayler v. Wilder propose basing the 
novelty of an invention on whether the community could access the inven­
tion before the time of "reward." 
The Patent Act embodies the concern for community access to informa­
tion espoused in Clothworkers of Jpswitch and Gayler v. Wilder. The 
Framers of the Constitution granted Congress the right to protect inventions 
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.32 In 1870, Congress acted pursuant to this 
30. The Clothworkers of lpswitch Case, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (K.B.). 
31. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S.477, 497 (1850). 
3 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries"). 
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power, followed the Gayer v. Wilder rationale, and inserted a novelty limita­
tion into the Patent Act. 33 
Section 102 of the Patent Act lays out the type and time limitations for 
actions and publications that may bar a patent from issuing.34 The most fre­
quently employed of these bars is § 102(b), the "on-sale bar."35 Section 
102(b) says that the inventor may not obtain a patent on an invention if "the 
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a for­
eign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.''36 Thus, 
U.S. publications, patents, sales, and uses of the invention will prevent a 
finding of novelty under§ 102(a) and (b ), while the only foreign actions that 
will prevent such a finding are foreign publications and foreign patents.37 
Similar to Clothworkers of Ipswitch and Gayler v. Wilder,38 where novelty 
hinged on the community's access to information, § 102(a) and (b) made a 
territorial distinction between the actions that would preclude a finding of 
novelty at a time when access to overseas information was difficult.39 
Elsner is a correct application of the historical Clothworkers of lpswitch 
and Gayler v. Wilder rationale even though such a broad test would arguably 
undermine the language of§ 102.40 Recall that Eisner's references consisted 
of a short foreign publication generally describing a plant and the foreign 
sale of that plant.41 In such a case, if one looked only to the § 102 catego­
ries-contrary to the Elsner holding--one would find the invention novel 
because the foreign publication insufficiently described the plant and the 
foreign sale is not covered by § 102(b ).42 But, by instead looking to the 
flexible approach of Gayler and Clothworkers of lpswitch, the court can find 
the invention is not new because the § 102 categories are not strict; they 
merely represent a tilt of the law in favor of precluding novelty based on a 
community's ability to access domestic versus foreign inventions. Based on 
33. This requirement is expressed in § 101 of the Patent Act, which states that anyone who 
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .  " 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (em­
phasis added). The procedure for determining novelty involves examining each pertinent publication 
or activity (known as prior art) reference to determine if it anticipates the claimed invention. CRAIG 
HOVEY, THE PATENT PROCESS: A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 
138-39 (2002). 
34. 35 u.s.c. § 102 (2004). 
35. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JoHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 325 (2003). 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added). 
37. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)-(b). 
38. The Clothworkers of lpswitch Case, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (K.B.); Gayler v. 
Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850). 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is based on an 1870 statute. 
40. See The Clothworkers oflpswitch Case, 78 Eng. Rep. at 148; see also Gayler, 51 U.S. at 
497. 
41. In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004 ). 
42. Id. 
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this understanding, just as was done in Elsner, a court would preclude a 
finding of novelty if it found the U.S. public could reasonably access the 
plant in order to sufficiently make and use the invention. Using such a flexi­
ble test, courts should reinterpret the Patent Act in light of technology that 
makes information more accessible to the public. This is consistent with 
Elsner where the court found the plant in possession of the public and did 
not allow the inventor to obtain a patent.43 Under the historical rationale and 
Elsner, a court should ask whether the U.S. public is in possession of the 
invention. The rationale of this test applies regardless of invention type. 
The continuous reinterpretation of the "printed publication" clause also 
bolsters the argument that courts should dynamically interpret the Patent Act 
novelty requirement based on an assessment of community access.44 The 
dynamic, technology-based interpretation of the "printed publication" clause 
of the Patent Act began as early as 1937 when Gulliksen v. Halberg45 stated 
that the § 102 printed publication bar could no longer be restricted to its 
outdated interpretation that only things printed with movable type46 could be 
a "printed publication." Instead, Gulliksen found that "the art of printing has 
undergone many radical changes so that at present day it would be almost 
impossible to have any printing done with the process in use in 1870" and 
the printed limitation was merely to ensure "a wider spread of the informa­
tion."47 Thus, the court determined that methods of printing which provide 
"distribution and accessibility" of the work to the public, and that provide 
works that are permanent and legible,48 are- within the § 102 language.49 
Thus, in Gulliksen, the court reinterpreted the language of the Patent Act in 
light of the changing technology scene to comply with the spirit of the stat­
ute. 
Courts now interpret the printed publication bar based on the purpose of 
the statute even if this requires loosely interpreting the statutory language. 
For instance, when analyzing whether microfilm would be a printed publica-
43. Elsner specifically used this public possession inquiry: "Because the published applica­
tions, combined with the foreign sales of the plants, placed the claimed inventions in the possession 
of the public, we therefore hold that they are proper§ 102(b) anticipatory references that may bar 
patentability." Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1129. 
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
45. 75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C. C.P.A. 1937). 
46. Id. at 253 ("[The printed publication clause] appeared for the first time in the Act of 
1870, and at that time, a printed publication could be produced in only one way, i.e., pieces of indi­
vidual type were set by hand and after an amount equivalent to a page had been composed, the type 
were locked in a frame, the face of the type treated with a coating of ink and the paper was then 
pressed on the type to produce an imprint."); Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Meaning of Term 
"Printed Publication" Under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) and (b), Denying Patentability to Invention 
Described in Printed Publication Before Invention by Application More Than One Year Prior to 
Date of Patent Application, 70 A.LR. FED. 796, § 6 (1984). 
47. Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253. 
48. Note that the court not only considered that the printing methods had improved since 
1870 but also that the library systems had improved in order to make even a single copy of a work 
more accessible. Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C. C.P.A. 1937). 
49. Id. 
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ti on bar under § 102, the CCPA took the view that "the 'probability of dis­
semination' of an item very often has little to do with whether or not it is 
'printed' in the sense of that word when it was introduced into the patent 
statutes in 1836."5° Further, the Federal Circuit often reads "printed publica­
tion" as a unitary concept even though this reading does not give meaning to 
both of the words "printed" and "publication" from the 1836 Patent Act lan­
guage.51 The Federal Circuit has traced the patent statute back to its roots to 
find that the printed publication bar of § 102 was designed to prevent an 
inventor from taking material that was already in the possession of the pub­
lic.52 Jn re ttyer,53 citing this history, stated that when this purpose of§ 102 
is met, the public dissemination reading is valid even if meaning was not 
given to both of the words "printed" and "publication."54 
Congress has not amended the language of the Patent Act in response to 
Gulliksen and many subsequent reinterpretations of the Patent Act.55 This 
silence offers at least some evidence that the case-by-case interpretation of 
the Patent Act language based on the changing technology scene is a proper 
method to interpret the Patent Act for all types of inventions.56 Just like Gul­
liksen, one can read Elsner to reinterpret the Patent Act to respond to 
technologies that make foreign objects more accessible to U.S. citizens. 
Eisner's holding applies only to plants, leaving open a broader interpre­
tation: 
The particular question thus before us is whether evidence of the foreign 
sale of a claimed reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non­
enabled printed publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a 
§ 102(b) bar. On that issue of first impression, we hold in the affirmative.57 
Since the holding of Elsner states that it decides only whether a § 102(b) 
bar resulting from foreign sales coupled with publications should apply to 
plant patents,58 the decision leaves open the possibility for movement in fa­
vor of harmonization of U.S. law with foreign laws. Currently, foreign laws 
50. In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
51. See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[O]ur precedent 
considers the term 'printed publication' to be a unitary concept that may not correspond exactly to 
what the term 'printed publication' meant when it was introduced into the patent statutes in 1836."); 
Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (D. Minn. 1960) ("The word 'printed,' as 
enacted in the statute, modifies 'publication'; they must be read together."). 
52. ttyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (citing In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
53. Id. at 221. 
54. Id. at 226 ("[I]nterpretation of the words 'printed' and 'publication' to mean 'probability 
of dissemination' and 'public accessibility,' respectively, now seems to render their use in the phrase 
'printed publication' somewhat redundant."). 
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005). 
56. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2292 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It merits empha­
sis, however, that prolonged congressional silence in response to a settled interpretation of a federal 
statute provides powerful support for maintaining the status quo."). 
57. In re Elsner, 381F.3d 1125, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
58. Id. 
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look to sales outside their borders to determine novelty;59 harmonization 
would mean that the United States looks at sales in foreign countries when 
deciding whether the U.S. public is in possession of the invention. 
Moreover, since Eisner's test is not unique to plants, courts can easily 
extend its test to non-plant inventions. Courts could apply the "possession 
test" to inventions patentable under § 101  just as it could be applied to 
plants because it uses a technology-neutral inquiry of: 
[W]hether one skilled in the art to which the invention pertains could take 
the description of the invention in the printed publication and combine it 
with his own knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be 
put in possession of the invention on which a patent is sought.6() 
Elsner further says the analysis should not tum on whether the prior art 
specifically meets § 1 02, but only whether it enables one to access the in­
vention-an inquiry that would not require the judge to know the 
technology in question.61 Working through this analysis for plants, the court 
says: 
When a publication identifies the plant that is invented or discovered and a 
foreign sale occurs that puts one of ordinary skill in the art in possession of 
the plant itself, which, based on the level of ordinary skill in the art, per­
mits asexual reproduction without undue experimentation .. .. 62 
One can easily see, however, that for any invention the "combination of 
facts and events [might] so directly convey the essential knowledge of the 
invention that the sale combines with the publication to erect a statutory 
bar."63 Therefore, even when the court applied the test to this case to deter­
mine that the public did have access, Eisner's analysis never depended on 
anything unique to plants.64 
Since Eisner's test is not unique to plants and the holding does not speak 
to whether it should apply to widgets, Eisner's test can extend to non-plant 
inventions. Applying Eisner's "possession test" to widgets would confirm 
historical rationales that the Patent Act should be reinterpreted to account 
for technology changes that allow communities to better access information. 
The next Section will discuss why, in addition to following historical ration­
ale, such an expansion would support the express goals of the Plant Patent 
Act. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C. P.A. 1962)). 
61. Id. at 1129-30 ("However, the precise focus of the analysis is not whether the foreign 
sales are themselves § 102(b) prior art, but whether the publication has placed the claimed invention 
in the possession of the public before the critical date."). 
62. Id. at 1129. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. ("Because the public may have had access to the claimed inventions through the 
foreign sales of the plants, from which the claimed plants may be reproduced, it may fairly be said 
that the PBR applications are adequately enabled."). 
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B. The Plant Patent Act and Subsequent Amendments 
Congress enacted the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act65 to give plant 
inventors the same rights as inventors of § 101 widgets. The PPA protected 
asexually reproducing plants66 by conferring the rights of inventors to ex­
clude others from asexually reproducing protected plants and from using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing any plants so reproduced.67 
The Plant Patent Act was a practical solution to the underinvestment in 
plant breeding because it gave plant research all of the opportunities avail­
able to researchers in other fields.68 It sought to promote private ventures in 
plant development that would enrich the public with disease- and drought­
resistant varieties of plants.69 In an attempt to meet these goals Congress 
stated that the Plant Patent Act: 
[I]s intended not only to correct such discrimination, but in doing so it is 
hoped the genius of y oung agriculturalists of America will be enlisted in a 
profitable work of invention and discovery of new plants that will revolu­
tionize agriculture as inventions in steam, electricity, and chemistry have 
revolutionized those fields and advanced our civilization.70 
This language suggests that the PPA would use the already organized utility 
patent system to promote private research and development into new plant 
varieties. 71 
65. The PPA was codified in Title 35 §§ 161-164, was passed on May 13, 1930, and signed 
by President Hoover on May 23, 1930. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application 
of Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C.S. §§ 161 et seq.), 135 A.L.R. FED. 273 (1996). 
66. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2004): 
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, 
including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber 
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefore, sub­
ject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for plants, 
except as otherwise provided. 
This is distinct from the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000), 
where the Department of Agriculture issues certificates to new sexually produced plant varieties as 
discussed infra Section LC. 
67. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000); see Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 
1383 (5th Cir. 1976). 
68. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOL­
OGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT, OAT-BA-370, at 71 (1989). 
69. Id. 
70. Jn re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 935 (C. C.P.A. 1962) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 71-1129 
(1930)). The Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 161) was passed as House Bill 11372 of the Second 
Session of the 7 lst Congress. Prior to 1930, there existed a common belief that plants, even those 
bred by man, were products of nature and therefore not subject matter for patent protection. Woos­
ter, supra note 65 at 2, citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980). With the passage 
of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, Congress attempted to dispel those widely held beliefs to show that 
the work of the plant breeder "in aid of nature " should be able to obtain protection. Id. at 312 (quot­
ing S. REP. No. 71-315, at 6-8 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 71-1129, at 7-9 (1930)). 
71. OFACE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 68, at 71; Diamond, 447 U.S. at 311-13. 
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But since its enactment, plant breeders have had an uneasy relationship 
with the utility patent statute's enablement and novelty requirements.72 Sec­
tion l.B. l and Section I.B.2 will describe the problems plant inventors face 
for meeting the enablement and novelty requirements under the traditional 
Patent Act. They will describe the congressional amendments that remedy 
the enablement problem but do not touch the novelty issues. Finally, Section 
l.B.3 will conclude that the necessary implication gleaned from the congres­
sional amendments is that plants should have the same novelty requirements 
as widgets. 
1. The Enablement Problem 
Congress has amended the Patent Act to solve enablement problems. 
Plant inventors have a problem with the enablement requirement because a 
specification for a plant application cannot be written that meets the disclo­
sure requirements of§ 1 12.73 Enablement is important because it represents 
the inventor's side of the social contract in exchange for patent rights.74 To 
be sufficiently enabling under § 112, an application must disclose to a per­
son of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the patented invention.75 
But, for plants, genes are too complex to write on paper, so there is no way 
to document and fully describe a plant invention within the four comers of a 
page. Even if an inventor knew the entire genetic lineage of her plant, the 
genes may combine in a new way on a subsequent sexual reproduction and, 
similar to the differences between siblings, two different plants with the 
same lineage would thereby result. Practically, the only way to enable a sub­
sequent inventor to make the invention is to "clone" the plant through 
asexual reproduction such as a cutting or a grafting.76 In other words, a sub­
sequent inventor would need to take a cutting of the plant and grow that 
72. See Peter J. Goss, Comment, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal 
Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (1996). 
73. 35 u.s.c § 112 (2004): 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out his invention. The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 
Section 112 thus requires that the patent specification describe the invention in sufficient detail 
to: (I) enable a subsequent inventor to make the invention, (2) provide the best mode of making and 
using the invention, and (3) provide a written description that shows the invention was in possession 
of the inventor at the time of filing the patent. 
74. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33-45 (1984 & 
Supp. 2001) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights 
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. R. 1017 (1989)); see also Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent !Aw, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 131 (1990). 
75. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004). 
76. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIV. OF ARIZONA, ARIZONA 
MASTER GARDENER MANUAL 17-23 (1998), available at http://ag.arizona.edu/pubs/garden/mg/ 
propagation/asexual.html. 
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cutting into a mature plant in order to fully make and use the patented inven­
tion. 77 Therefore, a specification for a plant application can never meet the 
enablement requirement of§ 112. 
Congress amended the PPA to correct for problems of enablement. The 
requirements of a utility patent were amended to add the express provision 
that botanical descriptions are enabling if they are "as complete as reasona­
bly possible" and in accordance with traditional botanical descriptions.78 
But, Congress made no accommodations for plants that struggled with the 
novelty requirement. These novelty problems are exactly those at issue in 
Elsner.79 
2. The Novelty Problem 
The novelty problem for plants means that even the best plant disclosure 
will not be sufficiently enabling to preclude novelty for a subsequent inven­
tion; Congress has failed to correct this problem. Looking to the patent 
application process best explains this difficulty. To determine novelty, the 
patent examiner compares a piece of prior art that fits within the time and 
type limitations80 to the disclosures in the patent application.81 He deter­
mines whether the prior art is enabling, meaning it sufficiently describes the 
invention as to preclude a finding of novelty. Generally, a prior publication 
is not enabling unless it contains and exhibits: 
a substantial representation of the patented improvement, in such full, 
clear, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science 
to which it appertains, to make, construct, and practice the invention to the 
same practical extent as they would be enabled to do if the information 
was derived from a prior patent.82 
Similar to the enablement problem, plant references cannot meet this 
novelty model because one cannot sufficiently disclose all of the genetic 
limitations on paper in order to preclude novelty for a subsequent invention. 
As was the issue in Elsner, this problem is most prevalent with inventions 
that are used and described abroad because the territorial distinctions on 
§ 1 02 restrict the patent office to only looking at foreign printed material.83 
This novelty disclosure problem is a mirror image of the aforementioned 
enablement disclosure problem. 
77. Id. 
78. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2004); S. REP. No. 71-315 (1930). 
79. In re Elsner, 381F.3d1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
80. HovEY, supra note 33, at 138-39. 
81. Id. 
82. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 555 (1870). Note that while a reference must be en­
abled to anticipate a patent and this analysis of this enablement is similar to that required in § 112, 
§ 112 only codifies the enablement requirements for patent applications, not the enablement re­
quirements for anticipatory references. 
83. See supra Section I.A; supra notes 34-37. 
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Even though the novelty and enablement ideas go hand in hand, when 
adding language to the PPA to correct the enablement problem at the disclo­
sure stage,84 Congress failed to correct at the novelty stage.85 Moreover, a 
bill proposed in Congress after Elsner that would alter the prior art stan­
dards for plants has failed to get much attention.86 
3. The Necessary Implication 
It is unlikely that the lack of disclosure amendment at the novelty stage 
was congressional oversight because the ideas of enablement and novelty 
are so interwoven. From a policy standpoint, the disclosure requirement en­
sures that each patent application is enabling for future inventors,87 the effect 
of this requirement is to put the public on notice of the invention such that it 
is no longer novel. For instance, one can imagine how under a system with a 
less strict§ 112 enablement requirement, one could patent a widget and sub­
sequent "inventors" could also patent the same widget because the first 
patent, by it terms, did not fully disclose the invention as to bar novelty for 
the subsequent "inventors." Thus, courts should interpret congressional si­
lence for novelty when these ideas are so closely related to mean that 
Congress did not haphazardly miss this change, but instead intended for the 
enablement-novelty requirement to stay the same for plants and utility pat­
ents. 
Further, Congress has amended the Plant Patent Act many times without 
addressing the enablement problem of § 102.88 Even after Elsner the most 
recent proposal to amend § 162 has attracted little attention.89 Therefore, 
since Congress makes an exception in § 162 for treating plants differently 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78. 
85. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 1 62 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 1 12), with 35 U.S.C. § 1 02. 
86. Plant Breeder's Equity Act of 2005, H.R. 1 2 1 ,  1 09th Cong. (2005). Representative Dar­
rell E. Issa introduced this bill on Jan. 4, 2005. As of September 1 8, 2005, this bill had attracted no 
major congressional action and no co-sponsors. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Inter­
net, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:h.r. 00 1 2 1 :  (last visited Sep. 1 8, 2 005). 
87. Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) 
("[P]atent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public. "); J.E.M. AG Sup­
ply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'/, 534 U.S. 1 24, 142 (2001)  ("The disclosure required by the Patent 
Act is the quid pro quo of the right to exclude. ") (citations omitted); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. 
Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TucH. L.J. 1085, 1 101 (2003); see, 
e.g. , Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement, Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 15  
AIPLA Q.J. 57 ( 1987) (disclosure is "a  primary purpose " of  the enablement requirement). 
88. As originally enacted, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was a series of amendments to the 
general utility patent law. Most prominently, section 4886 of the Revised Statutes was amended to 
read that "[a]ny person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine . . .  or who 
has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant . . .  may 
. . .  obtain a patent therefore. " Rev. Stat. § 4886 ( 19988), amended by Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 
§I, 46 Stat. 376 (current version split at 35 U.S.C. §§ IOI, 1 6 1 ). In 1954 the Plant Patent Act was 
amended to preclude patent protection for plants in an uncultivated state again without mentioning 
the special plant novelty issues. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-775, 68 Stat. 1 190. 
89. See supra note 86. 
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with regard to the written description requirement of § 11290 but makes no 
mention of the comparable § 102, the same law should be used for utility 
patents as those for plants. 91 This is especially true in light of the affirma­
tions that § 161 "engrafts the Plant Patent Act onto the basic patent law."92 
Further evidence that Congress intended § 102 to apply indiscriminately to 
plants as well as widgets is found by looking to the Plant Variety Protection 
Act. 
C. The Plant Variety Protection Act 
Congress says explicitly when to apply disparate treatment to different 
inventions; since Congress did not explicitly categorize asexually reproduc­
ing plants, then no disparate treatment should apply. An example of a 
statutorily created disparate treatment regime is the 1970 Plant Variety Pro­
tection Act ("PVPA").93 With the PVPA, Congress distinguished sexually 
reproducing plants from asexually reproducing ones and placed each in dif­
ferent categories.94 The PVPA then set forth specific rules for sexually 
reproducing plants and did not allow them to be patentable under the PPA.95 
This disparate treatment was necessary because the only inventions pat­
entable under Plant Patent Act were ones where the inventor met the social 
contract for full patent protection-sexually reproducing plants could not 
meet it.96 
The creation of the discriminatory scheme for sexually reproducing 
plants illustrates that when Congress intends discrimination against certain 
inventions, it speaks explicitly to the type of invention and to the different 
90. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (noting that § 1 62 allows a plant patent 
owner to have an insufficient written description and still fulfill the enablement requirement). 
9 1 .  This idea has also caught the courts and is developed further in LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 
(C.C.P.A. 1962). 
92. Le Grice, 301 F.2d at 933. In 1 952, Congress created a separate chapter of law, chapter 
1 62, to address plant patent law but affirmed that plants be treated under the utility patent statute. 
Wooster, supra note 65 at § 2. Although the 1 952 amendment placed Plant Patents in a separate 
chapter from utility patents, § 1 6 1  maintained that "provisions of this title relating to patent for 
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided." Wooster, supra note 65 at 
2; 35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1  (2 004) (emphasis added). 
93. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat. 1 542, amended by 1 994 Amend­
ments, Pub. L. No. 1 03-349, 3, 1 08 Stat. 3 1 38, 7 U.S.C. 2402(a) (2002). 
94. Elisa Rives, Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants 
and their Progeny Patentable under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1 87, 222-23 
(2001 --02). 
95. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat. 1 542, amended by 1 994 Amend­
ments, Pub. L. No. 1 03-349, 3, 1 08 Stat. 31 38, 7 U.S.C. 2402(a) (2002). 
96. Sexually reproducing plants are unable to meet the enablement requirements under the 
general Patent Act. Rives, supra note 94, at 222-23. Unlike microorganisms or asexually reproduc­
ing plants, sexually reproducing plants cannot meet the enablement requirement even with a deposit 
of the organism because sexually reproduced plants cannot be reproduced from the deposit beyond 
one generation. Id. 
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methods of treatment.97 As such, the PVPA is a scheme for treating these 
plant inventions differently because they provide different public benefits.98 
Since Congress did not set up any similar intellectual property scheme for 
asexually reproducing plants but instead engrafted it onto the existing patent 
law,99 there should be no discrimination between these plants and other pat­
entable inventions. 
IL JUDICIAL ACTIONS 
This Part argues that judicial interpretation of the Patent Act favors a 
"possession test" interpretation over an interpretation that limits Elsner to 
plants. Section II. A will show that prior interpretations of the Patent Act's 
"printed publication" clause sought to avoid different standards for different 
technology. Interpretations of the "printed publication" clause instead 
adopted a flexible test similar to Eisner's "possession test." Section II. A 
discusses how courts have anticipated patents by combining pieces of prior 
art; it shows that Eisner 's combination of a publication and sale to preclude 
novelty is not a groundbreaking approach. Section II.B will show that courts 
have interpreted the goals of the Plant Patent Act in a way that rejects any 
readings that require different standards for plants. Section II.C will then 
argue that the parallels between plants and microorganisms necessarily im­
ply that creating a standard unique to plants would be illogical. Finally, 
Section II. C argues that earlier judicial decisions have favored modifying a 
general rule to fit the new inventions over applying differing standards to the 
new inventions. 
A. Prior Interpretations of the Patent Act Are Flexible 
The courts have interpreted other sections of the Patent Act to apply a 
"possession test" similar to that of Elsner. Section II.A l will show that the 
meaning of "printed publication" has changed to one that considers the de­
gree of accessibility to and dissemination of an invention instead of 
delineating certain categories of technologies that create printed publica-
97. Under the PVPA, plant breeders are issued a certificate of protection for novel and dis­
tinct varieties that breed "true-to-type " through sexual reproduction-a requirement that is more 
restrictive than the PPA's novelty requirement. Jeremy P. Oczek, Note, In the Aftermath of the "Ter­
minator" Technology Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered 
Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REv. 627, 637-38 (2000). Also, certifi­
cates under PVPA are not administered under the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but are 
issued under the Department of Agriculture. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat. 
1 542, amended by 1 994 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 3, 108 Stat. 3 138, 7 U.S.C. 2321 
(2000). 
98. For instance, Oczek notes that "[t]he original rationale for restricting patent protection to 
asexually reproduced plants under the PPA was the belief that new plant varieties could not be re­
produced reliably by seed. " Oczek, supra note 97, at 537. The PVPA further has two significant 
limitations: the 'research exemption' and the 'crop exemption.' " Id. at 638. 
99. 35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1  (2000) ("The provisions of [Title 35] relating to patents for inventions 
shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided. "); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 933 
(C.C.P.A. 1 962). 
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tions from those that do not.'00 Section II.A.2 will discuss how the preemp­
tive categories of § 102 are not always interpreted as independent, and 
instead courts have combined the categories, making the category combina­
tion in Elsner unoriginal in this sense. 
1. Printed Publication Interpretation 
Courts no longer interpret the language of the Patent Act according to 
the framers' narrow definition. For instance, the meaning of "printed publi­
cation" under §§ 1 02(a) and (b)101 has branched out to include acts that the 
1952 Congress never could have contemplated: soft copy documents, for 
example.102 Similar to Elsner, this expansion has taken place because the 
courts have needed to adapt the "printed publication" bar to the changing 
methods of printing or copying. In fact, parallel to the Elsner test, the mean­
ing of printed publication in § 102(b) is now based on a test of public 
accessibility instead of adhering to the historic language from 1 623.w3 
Although courts originally found their description of "printed publica­
tion" broad, those definitions would be considered very narrow when 
compared to today's interpretation of the statutory language. For instance, 
courts originally restricted the meaning of "printed publication" in § 102 to 
the products of outdated movable type processes.'04 In 1 97 1, Phillips Elec­
tronic & Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics 
Industries, Inc. '05 applied this same language to invalidate a patent for elec­
trical tubes in light of a microfilmed copy of an anticipatory patent 
application. 106 The court stated that a restriction of the interpretation of the 
"printed" requirement of§ 102 solely to the products of a traditional print­
ing press would "ignore the realities of the scientific and technological 
period in which we live and the underlying rationale of Section 1 02."w7 In 
direct conflict with the age-old movable-type definition, the court ruled that 
1 00. This argument about printed publications is separate from the argument that the Con­
gress intended reinterpretation of the Patent Act because the judicial reinterpretation of "printed 
publication " has not spurred congressional action. See supra Section I.A. 
1 0 1 .  35 U.S.C. §§ 1 02 (a)-(b) (2000) deny a patent to any or part of any invention described 
in a printed publication before the invention or more than one year prior to the date of the patent 
application. 
102. For instance, although it did not invalidate the patent, the Northern District of Illinois 
recently considered the "Newspace Electronic Newspaper " as prior art for Amazon's U.S. Patent 
No. 5,754,939 (filed Oct. 3 1 ,  1995). See Pinpoint Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 03 C 4954, 2004 
WL 20330'.:9, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
103. "The phrase 'described in a printed publication' dates at least to the Patent Act of 1 623, 
Statute 2 1  Jae. I, Ch 3, § 6 which used the phrase 'described in some public work.' " Kobylak, supra 
note 46, at § 2, citing Evans v. Eaton, 1 6  U.S. 454 ( 1 8 1 8). The term "public work " was dropped in 
favor of "printed publication " in the Patent Act of 1870; this wording has been retained through the 
present Patent Act of 1 952, 35 U.S.C. § 102. Kobylak, supra note 46, at § 2 .  
104. See Gulliksen v. Halburg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C.C.P.A. 1 937). 
105. 450 F.2d 1 164 (3d Cir. 1 97 1) .  
1 06. Phillips E/ec. , 450 F.2d 1 164 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ). 
107. Id. at 1 1 70. 
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the term "printed" can include documents duplicated by modem methods 
and techniques as long as the documents are rendered available to the pub-
!. 108 IC. 
One can imagine these cases taking a different route where only "printed 
publications" created by a specific technology, for instance a printing press, 
would be barring under § 102. This route would be comparable to a reading 
of Elsner that varies novelty for certain technologies-such as, in this case, 
plants. But instead, similar to the "public accessibility" reading of Elsner, 
the printed publication decisions dealt with changing technology by finding 
that the publication bar relates broadly to public accessibility and degree of 
dissemination regardless of the technology in question. 
2. Single Prior Art Reference Rule 
Not only have the courts failed to adhere to the framers' narrow defini­
tions of the § 102 language, but they have also failed to adhere to the "single 
prior art reference" rule for prior art. Generally, finding an invention invalid 
for lack of novelty under § 102 requires that all elements of the invention be 
disclosed in some other single prior art reference or device.109 But, the Fed­
eral Circuit has allowed the use of extrinsic evidence to enable a prior art 
reference and therefore has combined two references to anticipate a patent. 
For example, in In re Samour1 10 the court used two references to hold the 
patent invalid. The court held a patent invalid for lack of novelty in light of 
an original reference which disclosed the name and structural formula for a 
chemical 111 and a second reference that showed a method of preparing the 
compound.112 Many cases then followed the In re Samour approach of com­
bining references to enable a primary disclosure.113 
1 08. Phillips Elec., 450 F.2d 1 164 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ). 
1 09. For instance, if  you claim A, B,  and C in your patent, then the only document or widget 
that can bar your novelty would be one that contains all of the elements: A, B and C. Kenneth R. 
Walton, The Use of Evidence Extrinsic to a Single Source to Support Anticipation, 20 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 339 ( 1994); see Kalman V. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 7 1 3  F.2d 760, 77 1 (Fed. 
Cir. 1 983), cen. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 ( 1 984). 
1 10. In re Samour, 5 7 1 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1 978). 
1 1 1 . The mere publication of the chemical name and formula did not show that the compound 
was in the possession of the public before the § l 02(b) one year bar. Thus, to enable the compound, 
the court used a second reference that showed a method of preparing the compound for a chemist of 
ordinary skill. Walton, supra note I 09 at 361-62; see Samour, 57 1 F.2d 559. 
1 12. Walton, supra note 1 09;  see Samour, 57 1 F.2d 559. 
1 1 3. In re Sasse followed this approach and invalidated a patent, in facts similar to Samour, 
by using a secondary reference that taught how to make the chemical compound to enable the pri­
mary reference that gave only the name and elements of the compound. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675 
(C.C.P.A. 1 980); Walton, supra note I 09 at 362-63. In Donohue the printed publication contained 
an abstract disclosing the chemical compound but the text did not disclose any preparative details, 
properties, or other test data. The court nonetheless found that the printed publication taken together 
with references that taught general preparatory methods, taught a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use the invention and thus put the public in possession of the invention. Donohue, 632 
F.2d 123 (C.C.P.A. 1 980); Walton, supra note 109, at 363-64. 
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Reference combination is also not limited to domestic sources. Abbott 
Labs v. Geneva Pharma, Inc. 114 used a reference combination to meet the 
§ 102(b) Pfaff v. Wells Electronics1 1 5 test. The court determined that the in­
vention met the Pfaff test and was ready for patenting by considering 
whether foreign manufacturers had reduced the subject matter to practice­
material not even within the § 102(b) domestic bar.116 
Eisner's possession test follows this lineage of cases by stating that a 
novelty analysis should not tum on whether the prior art specifically meets 
the § 102 categories, but only on whether it enables one to access the inven­
tion. The court stated that "the precise focus of the analysis is not whether 
the foreign sales are themselves § 102(b) prior art, but whether the publica­
tion has placed the claimed invention in the possession of the public before 
the critical date."1 17 Elsner specifically relies upon In re Donohue and 
Samour to support its expanded test even though neither case involved 
plants.118 One can conclude from these cases that, analogous to a reading of 
Elsner as a possession test, following the single reference rule is not neces­
sary so long as a combination puts the public in possession of the invention 
and one reference contains all of the elements. 
B. Nondiscrimination Is a Paramount Concern: In re LeGrice 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has previously read the 
Plant Patent Act to mean that plant nondiscrimination is more important 
than maintaining the current state of the Patent Act.119 Similar to Elsner, In 
re LeGrice1 20 interpreted the Patent Act and its unique application to plants. 
The issue on appeal was whether publications that disclosed as much about 
plants as possible but did not describe the entire invention would preempt a 
patent. 1 21 In deciding that they did not preempt, the Court of Appeals found 
many persuasive reasons in the legislative history to maintain that non­
discrimination for plants was important. 
1 14. The court rejected a drug patent to Abbott Labs because it was the subject matter of at 
least three commercial sales in the United States before the critical date. The court stated that "it is 
also clear that the invention was 'ready for patenting' because at least two foreign manufacturers had 
already reduced it to practice. "  Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm .• Inc . •  1 82 F.3d 1 315,  1 31 8  (Fed. Cir. 
1 999). 
1 1 5. Pfajf v. Wells Elec., Inc. , 525 U.S. 55 ( 1 998) (creating a two-part test for the on-sale bar 
that the invention be ( 1) subject to a commercial offer for sale before the critical date and (2) ready 
for patenting before the critical date). 
1 1 6. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("in this country "). 
1 17 .  In re Elsner, 381  F.3d 1 125, 1 1 29-30 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
1 1 8. Elsner; 38 1 F.3d at 1 129, cites Donohue, 766 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978), and Samour, 57 1 
F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978), to show that combining references is not unique. For a discussion of 
Donohue reference combination, see supra note 1 1 3. 
1 19. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
1 20. Id. 
1 2 1 .  See the discussion of enablement problems, supra Section LB. I .  
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First, as LeGrice found, the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act 
was very explicit that plant nondiscrimination is more important than main­
taining the current state of the Patent Act. As the legislative history revealed, 
the purpose of the PPA was to 
afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same opportunity to participate 
in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry and thus as­
sist in placing agriculture on a basis of economic equality with industry. 
The bill will remove the existing discrimination between plant developers 
and industrial inventors . . . . 122 
Even beyond providing equal opportunity, Congress enacted the PPA to 
motivate young horticulturalists.123 Thus, Congress stated that the PPA 
will afford a sound basis for investing capital in plant breeding and conse­
quently stimulate plant development through private funds . . .. [Because] 
[n]o one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward for service to 
the public should be extended to the inventor of a mechanical toy and de­
nied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given a 
valuable new variety of fruit or other plant to mankind. 124 
Then, speaking to the language of the PPA, LeGrice concluded that 
"Congress did not provide any exception thereto, so it should be presumed 
that Congress intended that it should be applied to patents for plants as it 
had been previously applied to patents for other inventions."125 
Applying Elsner narrowly to plants alone undermines the LeGrice re­
quirement that prior art for plants patents meet the same requirements as any 
other printed publications. 126 The Elsner court found that a foreign sale cou­
pled with a foreign disclosure puts the public in possession of the invention 
for plants even though it would not preclude novelty for widget inven­
tions. 127 The LeGrice court held that "plant descriptions in printed 
publications of new plant varieties, before they may be used as statutory 
bars under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), must meet the same standards which must be 
met before a description in a printed publication becomes a bar in non-plant 
patent cases." 128 In support of this holding, LeGrice went back to the idea of 
122. LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932 ("35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1  is based on an amendment, effective May 
23, 1 930, to R.S. 4886, (Sec. 3 1  of former title 35 U.S.C.), which originated in House Bill 1 1 372 of 
the Second Session of the 71 st Congress. "). The Committee on Patents filed a report with the lan­
guage quoted supra, text accompanying notes 1 22 and 1 24. Identical language was filed in a report 
by the Senate Committee of Patents. LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932. 
123.  LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932. 
1 24. Id. 
1 25 .  Id. at 933. 
1 26. The test in LeGrice merely "require[d] that the facts of each case be carefully considered 
to determine whether the description in the printed publication in question [did] in fact place the 
invention in the possession of the public. " Id. at 939. 
1 27.  In re Elsner, 3 8 1 F.3d 1 1 25 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
1 28.  LeGrice, 301 F.2d at  944. 
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public possession as the basis for novelty. 129 Thus, as LeGrice noted, a pub­
lic possession-based test would have the same requirements for plants as 
widgets. A narrow reading of Elsner that only applies it to plants would thus 
undermine the controlling LeGrice. 
C. Plants Are Not Especially Unique: In re Argoudelis 
Elsner cannot easily be restricted to plants because the disclosure diffi­
culties of plants are also present in microorganisms, thus fracturing any 
distinction that one can hope to draw between plants and other patentable 
inventions. In re Argoudelis involved a patent for a microorganism that was 
rejected for § 1 12 enablement problems despite being deposited in a public 
deposit. 130 The court was asked how microorganism inventors could meet the 
§ 1 12 enablement requirement.13 1 Two interesting things can be gleaned 
from the Argoudelis decision. First, Argoudelis shows the similarities be­
tween asexual plants and microorganisms make the treatment of plants as 
unique illogical. Second, the A rgoudelis court faced the choice between cre­
ating an exception to the Patent Act or adapting the statutory requirements; 
they chose the latter. This is the same decision the Elsner court was faced 
with, though the Elsner court chose to create a novelty exception unique to 
132 plants. 
First, Argoudelis shows that a problem with the application of the Elsner 
test strictly to plants is that the enablement problem of plants patentable 
under § 1 6 1  extends to things that can be patented under § 1 0 1 .  Noting the 
similarities between plants and other organisms, Elsner related its reasoning 
to Argoudelis. 133 The court in A rgoudelis rejected the inventor's argument 
that because there are similar enablement problems 134 for plants and micro­
organisms, microorganisms should benefit from the relaxed enablement 
requirement that plants have under the Plant Patent Act.135 While the court 
rejected using § 1 6 1  for enablement, they did note that similar problems for 
1 29. Id. at 939 ("Each case must be decided on its own particular facts in determining 
whether, in fact, the description in the printed publication is adequate to put the public in possession 
of the invention and thus bar patentability of a plant under the condition stated in section I 02(b )."). 
1 30. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
1 3 1. Id. 
132. Jn re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1 125 (Fed. Cir. 2 004). 
1 33. Id. at 1 1 3 1  ("It is important to note that it was not mere possession of the microorganism 
that was important in Argoudelis, but such possession that enabled one of ordinary skill to make the 
claimed invention. Similarly here. Just as the public had access to the microorganism in Argoudelis, 
so too might the public have had access through the foreign sales to the plant varieties that Elsner 
and Zary claim."). 
134. As discussed supra Section l.B.l , an enablement problem arises when an inventor cannot 
fully describe the inventions to the point that others could read the patent application and then make 
and use the invention. This problem arises for plants as well as organisms because scientists are 
currently unable to reconstruct such beings from a description, even a DNA sequence that is written 
on a page. 
1 35. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1392. 
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plants and microorganisms exist, 13 6 and they found that the deposit require-131 ffi . � h . . bl i3 s s· l ment was su 1c1ent ior t e m1croorgamsm ena ement. mce asexua 
reproduction occurs and no other meaningful differences exist between the 
plants of Elsner and the microorganisms of Argoudelsis, applying the Elsner 
decision only to plants would draw an arbitrary Iine.139 Therefore, a con­
strained plant-limited reading of the Elsner decision illogically distinguishes 
between plants and organisms with similar traits, while the broader "posses­
sion test" reading would apply it to all inventions based on the facts of each 
case. 
Second, the judiciary had formerly applied the Patent Act to non­
traditional inventions by adapting the statutory requirements of the general 
rules of the Patent Act to meet those inventions, not by creating exceptions 
for certain inventions under the Patent Act. 140 The microorganism in Ar­
goudelsis did not meet the statutory requirements because the public could 
not access the deposit until after the patent issued.141 The organizations that 
filed amici urged the court to modify the Patent Act and create a second ex­
ception for microorganism-type inventions that would match that of asexual 
plants.142 The court stated that its "task here is not to decide what the general 
rule should be or to create exceptions to the provisions of§ 112, but rather 
to interpret and apply § 112 to the facts of the case before [it]." 143 The court 
created deposit requirements for microorganisms that cannot be described 
and shown on the application and cannot otherwise meet the enablement 
standard. 144 Similarly, if the Elsner court wanted to avoid disparate treat­
ment, especially since Congress did not call for it in the statute, then its 
§ 1 02 modification and test of possession must be applied to all utility ob­
jects. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part argues that, consistent with Elsner, U.S. courts should strive to 
harmonize U.S. patent standards with international intellectual property law. 
Section III.A will discuss the importance of international cooperation to-
1 36. Id. at 1 392 ("[A] unique aspect of using microorganisms as starting materials is that a 
sufficient description of how to obtain the microorganism from nature cannot be given. "). 
1 37. The deposit requirement says that inventors must deposit some of their novel material 
into a public depository available to all inventors if they are otherwise unable meet the enablement 
requirements. Note that the PPA exempts plants from this requirement. 
1 38. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1 390 (C.C.P.A. 1 970). 
1 39. In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1 125 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
140. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1392. 
1 4 1 .  Id. at 1 392. 
142. Id. ("It has been pointed out in the Amicus Curiae brief that the same predicament exists 
in the case of asexually reproduced plants. In regard to plants, a general dispensation from the re­
quirements of § 1 1 2 has been accorded by 35 U.S.C. 162.  It is urged that the same should be true 
tiere. ") 
143. Id. 
1 44. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1 390 (C.C.P.A. 1 970). 
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ward the harmonization of intellectual property law and will argue that 
when looking for guidance on where intellectual property law is moving, 
courts should look to international bodies as well as Congress. Section III.B 
will then discuss the studies of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
("WIPO") and why their research should persuade U.S. courts to harmonize 
treatment of international sales. 
A. Hannonization Occurs in Response 
to lnfonnation Accessibility 
Not only is harmonization of laws a common theme in intellectual prop­
erty, but often what motivates such harmonization is the increased access to 
foreign goods and information-similar to increased access of foreign-sold 
goods at issue in Elsner. In patent law, the United States remains the only 
country using the outdated local novelty145 standard.146 But, the U.S. interna­
tional representatives have committed to harmonizing its novelty 
requirements. Following the Patent Law Treaty negotiations in 2000, the 
U.S. representative for the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Pat­
ents agreed to move forward with harmonization efforts by signing an 
agreement to define prior art as having no geographical limitations. 147 Be­
cause this recommendation comes as a response to increased access to 
foreign information and products, a court considering novelty should con­
sider the WIPO representative's goals of harmonization when formulating 
the modem novelty standard. 
Similar to how the novelty standard should change as people are increas­
ingly able to access products sold abroad, the change for well-known 
trademarks was sparked as people began to move around the globe and ac­
cess, and thus be confused by, well-known marks. Trademark law moved 
toward harmonization when transportation technology allowed people to 
145. Local novelty describes a scheme where distinctions are made between domestic and 
international prior art. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD INTEL. PROP. ORG., 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 
(SCP) CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF PRIOR ART, SCP/6/INF/2, para. 6, (2001 )  available at 
http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/session_6/pdf/scp6_inf2.pdf (finding summary of responses 
found only one country that still has a territorial distinction for prior art); see Kate H. Murashige, 
Harmonization of Patent Laws, 1 5  Hous. J. INT'L L. 591 ,  610 ( 1994). 
146. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1 883, 2 1  U.S.T. 
1 583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, amended July 14, 1967 [hereinafter "Paris Convention"], 2 1  U.S.T. 1 583, 
828 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. Speaking specifically to § 1 02, originally Australia 
and the United States both had a form of local novelty. But Australia has now moved to a system 
without such territorial distinctions-leaving the U.S. laws as the only ones still using of this re­
gime. Symposium, Cavalieri Hilton; 6th Open Forum; "Roundtable," IO U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 1 5 1 ,  162 (2002) (statement of Vivienne Thom). 
147. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD INTEL. PROP. 0RG., DRAFT SUB­
STANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY, (2004), art. 8, para. 1 ("The prior art with respect to a claimed 
invention shall consist of all information which has been made available to the public anywhere in 
the world in any form [,as prescribed in the Regulations,] before the priority date of the claimed 
invention."), available at http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/session_l O/pdf/scp 1O_4.pdf; 
Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small 
World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003). 
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move further and faster, and thus made the world a figuratively smaller 
place. Before 1883, there was a strict rule of territoriality, meaning that if a 
trademark was not registered in an individual nation then it was not pro­
tected in that nation.148 But as traveling between borders became more 
common, treaties began to harmonize domestic laws in order to protect 
marks globally. The Paris Convention maintained the same principal of terri­
toriality, 149 but also gave rights to "well known marks"--even over rights of 
domestic filers.150 In the mid-1990s, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec­
tual Property Rights ("TRIPs")151 treaty further strengthened this 
commitment to the "well-known marks" protection.152 The Drafters added 
the "well-known marks" clause because as people were increasingly able to 
travel across borders, they would be confused if well-known marks were not 
uniform. 153 The strengthening of protection for well-known marks shows 
how trademark law has changed in response to the public's ability to access 
international information. 
Similarly, just as the accessibility of works sparked harmonization in 
copyright law, 154 when a court recognizes that increased access to goods 
threatens the novelty standard, it should consider the harmonization efforts 
of the U.S. representatives that seek to maintain a constant level of protec­
tion. The system of copyright was harmonized in order to respond to a 
changed technological reality. An international system for copyright law 
began in 1886 with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. 155 Although the Berne Convention set standards for interna-
148. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 35. In 1883, the Paris Convention governed interna­
tional IP rights. Paris Convention, supra note 146. 
149. Paris Convention, supra note 146, art. 6(3). 
150. Paris Convention, supra note 146, art. 6bis ("The countries of the Union undertake, ex 
officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel 
the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imita­
tion, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of 
the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a 
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods."). 
151. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay 
Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, 33 1.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
152. See TRWs Agreement, supra note 156, art. 16, available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
153. Paris Convention, supra note 146, art. 6bis; see TRIPs Agreement supra note 151. 
154. See Steven Chase, Napster Clone May Set Up Shop Offshore, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, 
Mar. 5, 200 I, at A I (showing the risk of copyright violations when different countries have different 
copyright standards and information is easily accessed). 
155. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971 
1161 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter Berne Convention]. When the Berne Convention was developed, sev­
eral European countries had significant differences in their laws. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The 
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 737 (2001) (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTEC­
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 8-17 (1987)). The Berne Convention 
required nations to treat foreign applicants the same as their own nationals and set a series of mini­
mum standards of protection. See Berne Convention, supra. Members agree to a nation's addition to 
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tional law, it was relatively lax about allowing member states to retain dif­
ferent copyright regimes.156 Moreover, despite the relaxed standards, the 
United States did not harmonize its standards with many of the international 
copyright law standards until computers posed threats to copyright law.157 
Suddenly, "the ease with which works [could] be digitally reproduced, and 
digitally delivered to any location in the world, [meant] that international 
protection [was] required by producers merely to sustain their domestic 
market."158 When the threat of access to digitized works became realistic, the 
United States used the trade mechanisms of the G ATI Uruguay Round to 
harmonize both the copyright rules 159 and enforcement mechanisms. 160 
In light of the harmonization efforts that take place when global infor­
mation becomes more accessible, a court should look to international 
sources as a basis for informing decisions in areas where Congress is silent. 
Not only is the novelty standard threatened by the increased access to for­
eign sales, but the U.S. WIPO representative has spoken about the intent of 
the United States to harmonize U.S. with foreign laws. Thus, a broad inter­
pretation of Elsner is consistent with international trends in intellectual 
property and follows the recommendations of the U.S. WIPO representative. 
B. WIPO Is Uniquely Situated to Make Good Decisions 
In a recent proposal to WIPO from the United States, Japan, and the 
European Patent Office, the benefits of prior art were discussed and the re­
port stated that not only is harmonization on novelty issues on the horizon 
but it offers "consistent examination standards throughout the world, im­
prove[ d] patent quality, and reduce[d] the duplication of work performed by 
Berne once domestic practices are sufficiently harmonized; the Convention also provides a floor of 
minimum compliance for the member states. See id. 
1 56. While copyright law harmonization did occur under the Berne Convention, it is i mpor­
tant to note that member countries still have substantial freedom to tailor the minimum standards to 
meet their culture. Dinwoodie, supra note 155, at 740-4 1 .  This means that as long as each of the 
members is offered similar treatment, countries are free to offer those rights in ways sensitive to 
their individual cultures. Id. 
1 57. This is not to say the United States did not make any changes in order to accede to the 
Berne Convention. The 1 976 Copyright Act, for instance, eliminated the copyright term based on 
date of publication, moving the United States toward harmonization. William Belanger, U.S. Com­
pliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373 ( 1 995). The United States 
then adopted the Berne Convention Implementation Act ("BCIA ") to harmonize U.S. formalities 
such as registration and deposit requirements. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1 988, Pub. 
L. No. 1 00-568, 1 02 Stat. 2853. The BClA was an attempt to meet only the minimum standards for 
Berne. 
1 58. Dinwoodie, supra note 1 55, at 745. 
1 59. The tightening of the standards occurred in many stages. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1 -650, 1 04 Stat. 5089, 5 1 28-33 (codified as amended in scattered sec­
tions of 1 7  U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1 12 Stat. 2860 ( 1 998) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); TRlPs Agreement, supra note 1 5 1 ;  Dinwoodie, supra 
note 1 55 ,  at 744-45 (providing an account of the changes to international copyright law). 
1 60. International copyright standards were placed within the purview of the WTO Dispute 
settlement system for enforcement. TRlPs Agreement, supra note 1 5 1 ,  annex 2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf; Dinwoodie, supra note 1 55 ,  at 746. 
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patent offices."161 Courts should consider this statement because, while 
WIPO's recommendations are not binding on the United States, its unique 
position as a research organization means first that its representatives are in 
a good position to detennine when U.S. patent law is ripe for change, and 
second that its efforts are predisposed to well-considered advice.162 
WIPO meets its goal of promotion of global intellectual property163 by 
using expert committees to research various intellectual property issues and 
inform debate. 164 Additionally, since WIPO administers patent, trademark 
and copyright treaties, 165 it has the ability to look across these related fields 
and find best-practices. Speaking specifically to patent prior art, WIPO and 
its U.S. representative are not alone in their prior art recommendations­
many U.S. commentators have found the geographic limitation on § 102(b) 
• 166 unwise. 
WIPO also has incentives to continue carrying out high-quality studies. 
While the new World Trade Organization ("WTO") TRIPs agreement incor­
porated much of the existing WIPO regime, changes in the WIPO system 
did not automatically apply to WTO members. 167 Nonetheless, the WIPO 
interpretations of incorporated norms work to sway the WTO's decisions.168 
To be influential, WIPO will have incentives to carry out thorough studies 
and research on intellectual property topics to reach well-informed recom­
mendations. Because of these efforts, even when WIPO's policies are not 
expressly accepted, they still influence changes in local law.169 Therefore, 
WIPO has been a very active organization in influencing U.S. domestic pol­
icy through the courts170 and has incentives to maintain this status through 
well-considered and mutually beneficial research findings. 
While one might argue that a U.S. court would not want to change do­
mestic laws because this may result in the loss of a bargaining chip in 
1 6 1 .  STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD. INT'L PROPERTY 0RG., PROPOSAL 
FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE REGARDING 
THE SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY (SPLT), SCP/10/9, at 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=23 766. 
1 62. See WIPO's current research efforts at World Intellectual Property Organization, 
www.wipo.int (last visited Jul. 27, 2005). 
1 63. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter­
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. lNT'L  L. 1 ,  1 2  (2004) (citing Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 2 1  U.S.T. 1 749, 848 
U.N.T.S. (as amended on Sept. 28, 1 979), art. 3i). 
1 64. Helfer, supra note 1 63. at 12. 
1 65. World Intellectual Property Organization, www.wipo.int (last visited Jul.  27, 2005). 
1 66. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 147; 2 DONALD S.  CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02[5], 
at 6-54 ( 1 996); see Daniel H. Bliss, Comment, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Extending the Public 
Use Bar to Foreign Countries, 1 987 DET. C.L. REV. 65, 74-78 ( 1987). 
1 67. David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 A.J.I.L. 5, 19 (2002). 
1 68. Leebron, supra note 1 67, at 1 9. 
1 69. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Role of National Courts: The Architecture of The Inter­
national Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 993, 996 (2002). 
1 70. See Dinwoodie, supra note 1 69, at 1005 nn.58-60 (noting the recent conclusion of trea­
ties in copyright, patent and trademark law at WIPO). 
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international negotiations, 171 this statement does not apply well to WIPO 
recommendations. Such bargaining-chip style negotiations may not be ap­
propriate for refuting WIPO-based recommendations because, as mentioned, 
WIPO is more than a forum for haggling outcomes-it investigates best 
practices to recommend them for legislation.172 Moreover, when laws need 
to adapt to a changed technology scene, instead of trying to maintain theo­
retical bargaining advantages, courts should rely on the recommendations of 
U.S. WIPO representatives because they have taken into account the best 
interests of the United States in making their recommendation. The acting 
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has stated many of these 
domestic benefits: "Harmonization promises to bring substantial benefits, 
including uniform patent examination, reduced patent office workloads, and 
enhanced patent quality. The sooner we can agree on a basic framework, the 
sooner we can begin providing these benefits to patent applicants, patent 
offices and the public alike."173 Because WIPO acts as more than a bargain­
ing forum, applying a bargaining-chip mindset to WIPO decisions means 
courts will miss the benefits of tailoring domestic laws to changing technol­
ogy. 
Because WIPO's recommendations are well-researched, WIPO works to 
benefit member countries, and the expansion of the patent system has been 
largely a function of judicial adaptation, 174 a court can safely look to WIPO 
recommendations in areas of congressional silence when trying to adapt the 
Patent Act to changing technology and public accessibility. The Elsner court 
has already proposed a test that takes an affirmative step toward harmoniza­
tion that the international community believes could usefully apply to all 
objects. Subsequent courts should follow the WIPO recommendations and 
1 7 1 .  See Harold C. Wegner, Elsner: Judicial Drive to Eliminate the Territoriality Limitations 
of "Prior Art, " 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 747 (2004). 
1 72. For instance, WIPO leads investigations to find out how IP rights affect traditional 
knowledge. INTERGOV'TAL COMM. ON INTEL. PROP. AND GENETIC RESOURCES, WORLD INT'L PROP­
ERTY 0RG., INTELLECTUAL NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS 
( 1 998-99) (200 I), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 
2005); see also Overview of WIPO's Activities & Services, http://www.wipo.int/activities/en (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2005) ("WIPO carries out a wide variety of activities and services in its work. These 
include establishing international standards for intellectual property laws and practices and provid­
ing registration services that allow patents, trademarks, and designs to be protected in many 
countries. WIPO also extends various technical and legal assistance to developing countries, facili­
tates resolution of intellectual property disputes, and explores new issues arising in the global 
intellectual property arena. In all these activities, the latest information technologies are employed 
to promote efficiency and facilitate the electronic exchanges of information on intellectual prop­
erty. "). 
1 73. STATEMENT OF JoN DUDAS, UNDER SEC. OF COMMERCE FOR INTEL. PROP. AND ACTING 
DIR. OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at www.uspto.gov (last visited Janu­
ary 6, 2005). 
1 74. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14, 
1 967, 2 1  U.S.T. 1749, 1 1 54 U.N.T.S. 437 (as amended Dec. 2 1 ,  1 979) ("(i) to promote the protec­
tion of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where 
appropriate, in collaboration among the Unions "); see also Vision and Strategic Direction of WIPO, 
www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005). 
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interpret Elsner to encompass "widgets" as well as asexually reproducing 
plants. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the congressional and judicial sources shows that 
courts should broadly apply Eisner 's possession test to § 1 0 1  inventions and 
thereby change the § 102 bar for inventions patentable under § 101  to the 
same standard that it applied for plants. This Note first examined the con­
gressional sources to show a history of a flexible test--one that does not 
prejudice any objects under the Patent Act. It then showed that past interpre­
tations of the Patent Act adapted general standards for new circumstances 
instead of creating exceptions for certain inventions to suggest that plants 
should not be excluded from the general provisions of the Patent Act with­
out express congressional language. It used In re Argoudelis to show that 
since the problems of In re Elsner are not unique to plants, reading Elsner to 
create a plant-specific exception would be to apply it arbitrarily. Finally, this 
Note argued that for intellectual property there are many reasons to regard 
the recommendations of international bodies--even if at the risk of losing a 
U.S. bargaining-chip. Thus, interpreting the Patent Act according to current 
domestic and international trends leads to a broad reading of Elsner that 
would apply its "possession test" to all utility inventions and would further 
harmonize U.S. with foreign law. 
